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Abstract
Background: In most societies the health marketplace is pluralistic in character, with a mix of formal and informal
providers. In high-income countries, state regulation of the market helps ensure quality and access and mitigate
market failures. In the present study, using Haiti as a case study, we explore what happens to the functioning of the
pluralistic health marketplace in severely disrupted environments where the informal sector is able to flourish.
Methods: The overall research design was qualitative. Research methods included an extensive documentary and
policy analysis, based on peer-reviewed articles, books and “grey” literature–government policy and program
reports, unpublished research and evaluations, reviews and reviews from key multilateral and bilateral donors, and
non-government organisations, combined with field site visits and in-depth key informant interviews (N = 45).
Results: The findings show that state fragility has resulted in a privatised, commoditised and largely unregulated
and informal health market. While different market segments can be identified, in reality the boundaries between
international/domestic, public/private, for profit/not-for-profit, legal/illegal are hazy and shifting.
Discussion: The lack of state capacity to provide an enabling environment, establish, and enforce its regulatory
framework has resulted in a highly segmented, heterogeneous and informal health market. The result is deplorable
health indices which are far below regional averages and many other low-income countries.
Conclusions: Working in fragile states with limited capacity to undertake the core function of securing the health
of its population requires new and innovative ways of working. This needs longer time-frames, combining
incremental top-down and bottom-up strategies which recognize and work with state and civil society, public and
private actors, formal and informal institutions, and progressively facilitate changes in the different market functions
of supply, demand, regulation and supporting functions.
Background
Most contemporary health systems are mixed in char-
acter. That is, to varying degrees they consist of a
mix of public and private healthcare providers, and
both bio-medical and traditional practices with a var-
iety of financing mechanisms. In many countries this
mix of providers is understood in terms of competing
health markets, based on the assumption that competition
between providers facilitates improvement in efficiency
and consumer choice [1]. For competitive health markets
to work effectively however, they need to be regulated
through law, regulation, or contracts, and in most high-
income countries relatively well-established market regu-
lation mechanisms exist and are enforced [2, 3]. In many
low and middle-income countries on the other hand,
effective regulatory arrangements are often constrained by
limited resources, poor understanding by regulators of
their role and low incentives to take action in the case of
non-compliance [4]. In such contexts, often those who are
wealthier benefit from relatively effective regulatory mech-
anisms, while the poor typically rely largely on informal,
unregulated health markets [5].
Tschumi and Hagan [6] argue that within a market
system, there are three main sets of functions: core, rules
and supporting functions. The core relates to the central
set of exchanges between the supply and demand-side of
goods and services. These exchanges are shaped by both
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formal and informal “rules of the game” and supporting
functions. Formal rules are usually the domain of gov-
ernments or professional bodies. Informal rules on the
other hand, are generally a product of local culture and
value systems [6]. Supporting functions include consult-
ation processes; research and development; information;
co-ordination; and infrastructure [6]. To ensure that
health markets function efficiently and equitably, the
most critical role of the government is to provide an en-
abling environment and establish the ‘rules of the game’
for individual markets to function [7]. Understanding
how markets work in fragile states, where governance is
very weak and health outcomes may be even poorer
when compared to other low-income countries, is an
important step in developing transitional strategies that
may complement limited state capacity [8].
This research, examining the health markets of Haïti
as an example, allows us to explore how these core func-
tions within the healthcare market adapt when the state
is unable to meet its responsibilities to provide health
services to its population. It examines how the health
market evolves in response to state fragility, and what
rules—formal and informal—develop in the context of
limited state governance. The paper discusses how in
the absence of state capacity to establish and enforce a
regulatory and coordination framework, a highly pluralis-
tic and informal health market has evolved which operates
largely outside of the legislative frameworks governing
heath care. Further, while we present our findings under
the different market segments of domestic, international
and pharmaceutical, in this informal health marketplace
where regulation is weak, the boundaries between the
different segments are often blurred and dynamic
making such distinctions somewhat artificial. We
argue that in this context the size, scope and reach of
public health services are severely reduced, leaving
space for the establishment of a health market driven
largely by self-interest. We also draw attention to the
need for donors, service providers and health services
researchers in fragile states to extend their analysis be-
yond the formal public health sector, which in such con-
texts, provides a relatively limited amount of healthcare
services. While we cannot draw generalizations from a
single country case study, we aim to highlight the import-
ance of informal markets in complex and fragile environ-
ments and the need for donors and non-state actors to
engage with the state despite its limitations.
The challenges of undertaking research in fragile and
conflict affected states means the there is a lacuna of
knowledge of how health systems work in such environ-
ments. Further, much of the health literature related to
such environments has focussed primarily on aspects re-
lated to Western aid or the public sector even when the
state is largely absent. Such a focus however, ignores
much of the healthcare arena. This paper is important in
adding to our current limited knowledge base of how
health markets evolve in response to total or partial state
failure. It considers the usually overlooked informal
mechanisms that allow for healthcare provision in such
difficult environments, and points to the need for donor-
s—and governments—to develop new modes of engage-
ment with these emergent service providers. While
recognising the challenges, we also call for further
research to deepen our understanding of how to opti-
mise the contribution of these health markets that con-
tinue, despite social, political and economic disruption,
to deliver health in fragile and conflict affected states.
Haïti
Haïti’s two centuries of independence have been plagued
by poverty, violence, political instability, violent over-
throws, successive coups, countercoups and dictatorship,
alternating with occupation by foreign troops, including
those of the United States of America from 1915 to 1934
[9]. This fragile situation has been further exacerbated
by repeated disasters, often of a huge scale, which have
diverted both international and domestic resources to
humanitarian goals at the expense of development ones.
These repeated political and natural disasters result in
‘routinized ruptures’ and a continuous state of ‘insecur-
ity’ or ‘ensekirite’ as it is termed in the local Kreyòl,
which undermine Haïti’s efforts to consolidate its dem-
ocracy and create a climate of peace and security [10].
Haïti is the poorest country in the Western Hemi-
sphere and one of the highest aid-recipient countries in
the world. The country’s Human Development Index
0.458 ranked 161 of 179 in 2012, and has remained
roughly stagnant since 2005, as opposed to the climbing
indices in Latin America and the Caribbean [11]. This
extreme poverty reflects on social indicators such as lit-
eracy, life expectancy, infant mortality, and child malnu-
trition [12]. Officially, Haïti’s health system is divided
into four sectors: 1) public; 2) private not-for-profit
(NGOs and religious organizations); 3) mixed not-for-
profit (private management with staff paid by the Minis-
try of Public Health and Population (MSPP); 4) private
for-profit [13]. Overall management of the decentralised
health sector resides with the MSPP, with delegated
responsibility to the Départements, although its manage-
ment capacity is weak and public health providers oper-
ate with variable population reach and quality [13]. Most
primary health care is provided by non-state actors,
while the state retains the main responsibility for sec-
ondary and tertiary care, most of which is concentrated
in Port-au-Prince, with fees for services and products that
are often beyond the reach of the majority of the popula-
tion [14, 15]. The 2011 earthquake further disrupted the
already fragile public health system, destroying much of
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the MSPP central infrastructure, and resulting in a large
increase of International NGO health services [16].
The quality of the healthcare system is reflected in its
basic health indices, which compare poorly with its re-
gional neighbours: the EMMUS-V survey estimates life
expectancy at birth to average 62 years; a maternal mor-
tality ratio of 350 per 100,000 live births compared to a
regional ratio of 63, in part explained by only 38 % of
births with skilled birth attendants (59.6 % urban, 24.8 %
rural) compared with 93 % across the region [17].
Under-5 mortality is 88 deaths per 1000 live births, and
DPT3 rates hover around 62.5 % compared to regional
averages of over 85 %. Despite comparable TB treatment
success rates, prevalence at 314 per 100,000 is multiples
of the regional prevalence of 36, and linked inevitably
with its HIV at 2.2 % prevalence — the highest in Latin
America [12]. Acute malnutrition among under-5 chil-
dren is 5 %, and chronic malnutrition 22 % [17], and is
the highest in Caribbean and Latin America. Infectious
diseases continue to cause unnecessary deaths and
chronic diseases are increasing [18].
Methods
This research is one of six country case studies, examin-
ing the provision of health services in fragile and conflict
affected states, largely funded by the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and coordinated through the Australian
Centre for International and Tropical Health (ACITH),
at the University of Queensland. The six countries were
selected for the diversity of their social, political and his-
torical evolution: Afghanistan, Central African Republic
(CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haïti,
Palestine and Somalia. The overall purpose of this larger
research project was to provide greater understanding of
the provision of health services in fragile states and to
examine the ways in which health systems react, adapt
and evolve in response to total or partial state failure,
and how national and international stakeholders respond
to such challenges. The findings of the study have been
published in peer reviewed publications and in detailed
country reports [19–21], [www.sph.uq.edu.au], [22]. The
objective of this component of the Haïtian case study
was to examine how the Haïtian health market has
evolved in response to state fragility.
The research was grounded in an extensive documen-
tary and policy review, based on peer-reviewed articles,
books and “grey” literature—government policy and pro-
gram reports, unpublished research and evaluations, and
reviews from key multilateral and bilateral donors, and
non-government organisations. A search was undertaken
using databases including Ovid Medline, Embase, Web
of Knowledge, Web of Science and web-based searches
of data available in the public domain and hand-
searching relevant journals. Searches from 1995, with a
particular focus on the period since the United Nations
peace-keeping intervention in 2004, were undertaken
prior to the interviews in 2011, and updated for this ana-
lysis. Key words included: health, health systems, health
services, conflict and fragile states. Documents were also
collected from people working in fragile states, including
those who were interviewed. Qualitative, quantitative
and mixed method studies and documents in French
and English documents were included.
In-depth interviews were undertaken using a topic
guide prepared by the research team for all case-studies
and adapted to the specific Haïtian context by authors
MJM and PSH, who undertook the interviews between
January and February 2011 in Haiti. Qualitative inter-
views were chosen because of their ability to provide in-
depth descriptions of the health system and the experi-
ential perspectives of stakeholders [23, 24]. The topic
guide used for the interviews related to the overall ob-
jectives of the broader study and included question
prompts about health service provision and the impacts
of social, economic and political disruption on health
services. While topic guide was used, the interviews also
allowed participants to talk about health service provision
in their own words focussing on the issues that they felt
were important. This provided the interviewer the flexibil-
ity to follow up and clarify participant ideas and adapt in-
terviews as the study progressed and new insights were
gained. This means that as is often the case in qualitative
research, there were some differences in the ways in which
questions were framed and answered [23, 24].
Key informants were purposively selected, using the
organogramme of the MSPP to identify senior admin-
istrative staff, and the humanitarian donor coordin-
ation list, to identify donor and NGO representatives.
These respondents identified further relevant infor-
mants, and provided contacts with both the Cuban
Brigade and representatives of the Département at
Cap Haïtien. A seminar at the Université de Notre
Dame de Haïti allowed us to present the outline of
our research, and facilitated introductions. A total of
forty-five interviews were undertaken in Haïti with
key representatives of the MSPP, multilateral and bi-
lateral donor agencies, academic institutions, NGOs
and private practitioners, in Port-au-Prince and Cap
Haïtien. Identified key-informants were contacted by
phone, and interviewed at their work premises by one
or both researchers, with notes maintained and edited
within 24 h following debriefing between the authors
and corroboration of findings. Verbal consent was ap-
proved by the University of Queensland Behavioural
and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee on the
basis that “informants are senior personnel in national
or international agencies, responsible for the health
systems issues they will be discussing.” The research
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proposal and ethics approval were provided to the
Director-General of the MSPP and the chair of the
MSPP ethics committee on arrival in Haïti. Although
the key informants were bilingual, interviews were
undertaken in French or English (or in the case of Cuban
informants, Spanish) depending on the interviewees’ pref-
erence. Notes of the interviews were made during the
interview, with direct quotations in the language used, but
translated by the interviewers prior to analysis. All inter-
views were undertaken following reading of the informa-
tion sheet witnessed by the interviewer(s). The information
sheet was provided in English, and discussed and clarified
in French where necessary prior to verbal consent to
proceed. Table 1 summarises the number of respondents
by category and location.
MJM and PSH initially manually coded the interview
data from notes primarily recorded in English. Coded
data was grouped into the key themes guided by the
broader project research questions and corroborated by
the second researcher. Subsequently, the Haitian data
was reanalysed by JD and PSH, with a focus on those
themes relating to health markets and financing.
Triangulation of the qualitative data was achieved by
using different methods (program documentation re-
view, interviews) and interviewing participants from dif-
ferent sectors. In addition, field notes and contact forms
were maintained ensuring an audit trail. Further cred-
ibility safeguards included the authors manually coding
the data into themes and integrating the interview data
with the document review. The initial draft of the re-
search report was reviewed by the whole research team,
edited and submitted to three independent researchers
in Haïti for review. Anonymity and confidentiality of
participants were protected by the use of coding and
strict security measures, which included storing docu-
ments and recordings in a locked cupboard and/or on a
password protected computer.
Results
The findings of this research are presented using the
different market segments to structure the analysis.
Using a systems approach to the analysis, enables an
examination of the interconnectedness and blurring of
boundaries between the different market segments,
the financial incentives that drive supply and the for-
mal and informal institutional arrangements that exist
and influence outcomes. This analysis recognises that
the Haïtian health marketplace is in essence mixed,
with the different practices, financing mechanisms
and market segments found in a contemporary health
markets. State fragility, limited regulation and coord-
ination of the system, and the significant contribution
of the not-for-profit sector to public services means
that the lines between public and private healthcare
are highly permeable. Thus, although in presenting
the findings, for ease of discussion we use terms such
as ‘public’ and ‘private’ and ‘domestic’ and ‘inter-
national’, we recognise that this is an unrealistically
concrete division. The findings illustrate that despite
the state being largely absent, a richness of initiatives
have developed by a range of providers.
The domestic marketplace
The domestic market consists of state and private pro-
viders. Publicly delivered services are severely under-
funded with limited coverage outside of urban areas. Most
of the available budget is used to cover salaries. Salaries
are low and can force even public servants and doctors
with high responsibilities to combine their job with other
functions. Low pay, limited facilities and weak account-
ability mechanisms contribute to an almost dys functional
public health system. Doctors in state health facilities
interviewed for this study, reported that medical material
and drugs in the General Hospital of Port-au-Prince, are
bought by the patients (interns and residents at times cre-
ated informal cross-subsidies by making well-off patients
buy more syringes and intravenous fluids than needed, for
instance, and using the surplus for poor patients). Interns
and residents also must provide their own diagnostic
equipment, such as thermometers and sphygmomanome-
ters. A lack of state funding means that each of the public
hospitals seeks complementing income and equipment
from external sources and partners (which can lead
to the paradoxical situation that a District Hospital
with an effective director may offer better services
than the Départmental Hospital).
The inability of the MSPP to provide sufficient financing
in essence makes the public sector commercial, with
healthcare workers selling both health services and prod-
ucts, further blurring the lines between public and private.
The presence of a large not-for-profit sector also weakens
demand for both public services. The private for-profit
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health sector is primarily located in Port-au-Prince and
consists of physicians, dentists, and other health care spe-
cialists [25]. Both government and donor informants indi-
cated that the formal for-profit market is very limited, due
in part to the high prices in the face of widespread
poverty, the opportunity for the wealthy to use hospital
services abroad and competition from the not-for-profit
sector. The informal for-profit market addresses much of
the popular demand among the poorest, with untrained
drug sellers offering medicines of questionable quality in
the markets. The presence of so many non-state pro-
viders contributes to market flaws. This includes an
under-supply of population health services, a relative
over-supply of curative services, an over-prescription
of pharmaceuticals and asymmetrical knowledge be-
tween providers and patients.
Another segment of private sector is the traditional
market which is used by a large proportion of Haïtians.
Jones et al [25] found that nearly half of the population,
particularly in the rural areas, relied on traditional medi-
cine. Informants argued that Haïtians were creative in
their capacity to “muddle through”, and recourse to trad-
itional medicines Petit-Frère et al. [26] showed use of
home remedies for 71.6 % of symptoms in Petit Goâve,
and cite other studies with percentages of traditional auto-
medication ranging between 60 % and over 89 %. Another
study cited revealed a density of one traditional healer for
every 107 inhabitants in Artibonite, compared to 2.7
health professionals for every 10,000 inhabitants. Western
medical services are concentrated in major coastal centres
of population, with only traditional medicine available in
the rural hinterland above an altitude of 500 metres [26].
The traditional health sector usually incurs some monet-
ary or non-monetary out of pocket expenses.
The international marketplace
Interviews with our informants and the literature sug-
gest that the domestic health market—formal and infor-
mal, public and private, not-for-profit and for-profit—is
integrally linked to a larger, complex international health
market. The international not-for-profit segment domi-
nates the healthcare market with the major health
spending made through multi and bilateral lateral fund-
ing mechanisms, philanthropic funding, public-private
partnerships and donor contracting of not-for-profit ser-
vice providers. The U.S. and Canada are among Haïti’s
largest bilateral donors with much of their assistance
channelled through non-governmental agencies. It is es-
timated that before the 2010 earthquake, approximately
half of all spending on health services was provided by
donors and that between 2009-2010 US$ 333.71 million
of overseas development assistance (ODA) was spent on
health [27]. The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria (Global Fund) has provided finding to Haïti
since 2003 with country has receiving a cumulative total
of US$ 274,991,502 between 2003 and 2014 [28]. Through
PEPFAR, Haiti has received $ 773.8 million between 2004
and 2011 [29]. Table 2 shows the largest sources of ODA
disbursements for health for the period 2009-2010.
The 2011 earthquake led to an increase in providers
and following the earthquake, there were reportedly
more than 400 health organizations and agencies con-
tributing to the response, creating a major coordinating
challenge in chaotic circumstances [16]. Emerging health
governance was again eroded. One independent Haïtian
health consultant described it acutely: “We are not at
war, but it is as if we were at war… this instability”. Long
term strategic planning is sacrificed to reactive re-
sponses, with a senior official from a key multilateral
reflecting on the demands of recurrent crises: “things
happening all the time… everything is prioritized and ur-
gent, and we don’t manage; it’s a vicious circle.” The
subsequent hurricane and cholera epidemics further
contributed to significant increases in external donor
funding without a corresponding increase in local ab-
sorptive capacity; in fact, the past decade has seen what
one bilateral agency staff member characterised as “a
permanent and inevitable collapse” of the public health
sector [30, 31].
Many of the NGOs, especially relief NGOs, are reliant
largely on international donor funding and employ a
mainly international workforce for management and
technical inputs. Respondents explained that the different
not-for-profit NGOs work in various ways which include
running services in MSPP-owned premises, sometimes
with the MSPP providing salaries, or an NGO may pay or
top-up MSPP salaries. In addition, there are population
level disease-specific, vertical international programs such
as Global Fund initiatives for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria. The MSSP has been successful in several of these
collaborations, introduction free obstetric care, reducing
HIV prevalence, showing progress in immunization initia-
tives such as polio. But international organisations have
largely assumed control of these vertical programs, despite
the coordination mechanisms recently introduced by
the MSPP. The massive growth of the international
NGO industry — reluctantly tolerated by the state —
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and the state’s limited available domestic resources,
have resulted in a passive stalemate: limited effort has
focussed on local capacity building, integration with
or transfer to MSPP control.
In addition to NGOs providers, since 1998, the not-
for-profit sector has included services through a bilat-
eral agreement: the Cuban Brigade. At the time of
the study, the Cuban Brigade worked in 70 health
facilities in Haïti for which they were responsible and
seconded staff to another 87 health facilities. The
policy of the Cuban Brigade is to work alongside local
counterparts whenever possible, and to hand over in
the long run, to the MSPP although it was reported
that there is no fixed timeline for this to occur.
The diaspora was reported to also account for a
proportion of national health care expenditures
through remittances, provision of services and assist-
ance in linking in-country patients with providers out-
side of Haïti’s national border. Thus while the international
health market dominates the health market place, its links
with the domestic market are multiple and complex with
the domestic market ultimately dependent on the inter-
national market.
The pharmaceutical market
In the public sector, direct control of the central medical
stores was relinquished by MSPP in the 1990s under pres-
sure from international agencies, and a collaborative initia-
tive PROMESS (Programme de Médicaments Essentiels),
was established under the management of PAHO. PRO-
MESS is responsible for undertaking needs analysis, creat-
ing lists of required drugs and procuring drugs from
Washington and other international sources for redistribu-
tion to public sector (MSPP and Départements) and regis-
tered NGOs with a minimal price margin (about 15-20 %).
It also procures other products for MSPP which are funded
by donors or other UN agencies (UNFPA, UNICEF) for
free distribution in programs in immunization, TB, malaria
and filariasis. Increasing regulation around the requirement
for registration to access PROMESS benefits however was
reported to have led to exclusion of non-registered NGOs
from MSPP coordination activities. Nevertheless, NGOs
which resist registration and coordination were reported to
be able to continue because of their independent supply
lines. This has had the unintended consequence of limiting
MSPP awareness of sectoral activities to those of compli-
ant, registered agencies.
There are three pharmaceutical laboratories approved
to produce pharmaceuticals across a limited range of
drugs. Local production however is inadequate, unregu-
lated, and there is no system of quality control applied
by the MSPP [25, 32]. Unpredictability of supply and de-
mand that results from the surges of international
agency activity, and the direct and indirect consequences
of their varied pharmaceutical supply systems, means
that local production is unable to be predictably devel-
oped. The MSPP now requires importers to be regis-
tered and for each drug (by specific brand preparation,
not generic active ingredients) importation to be separ-
ately authorised. This is perceived by NGOs however, to
be both costly and time consuming, with a series of
approval steps contributing to delays. Humanitarian
relief NGOs, expecting a short time frame of engage-
ment in Haïti, frequently circumvent the requirements–
despite expedited processing of approvals being devel-
oped by the MSPP. Experienced health consultants
working in Haïti also pointed out that “donations” can
prove to be very expensive to the MSPP, with the ap-
proval processes involving real and opportunity costs for
staff within the MSPP. Further, when relief agencies exit,
there is often a massive “dump” of residual pharmaceuti-
cals into the market which was reported to be severely
disruptive, and persistent, despite strong MSPP requests
to ensure alternative exit strategies. The private informal
sector was also reported to have its own unregulated
supply chains with demand boosted by self-
medication, a common practice, particularly among
the urban poor. According to several of our respon-
dents, including those in multilateral agencies advis-
ing the MSPP, the multiple small scale importers in
the private informal sector “escape all attempts at
control”. Recourse to private, traditional medicine,
particularly in rural areas was reported to be high,
where access to modern pharmaceuticals is limited.
Governance and market regulation
The development of governance and policy within the
health sector reflects the broader political history of
Haïti, and its “routinized ruptures”. There is a clear
link between the fragility of the state and the lack of
an effective health system. The capacity of the state
to provide health services is constrained, not only by
finances and human resources, but by political fail-
ures. In the words of one bilateral donor consultant:
“the social contract is weak”. He observed that the
regular changes in Ministers of Health have further
depleted the capacity of the MSPP to develop and
introduce policy, as “each time the next starts from a
blank slate”. With the loss of corporate memory
resulting from the change in the upper bureaucracy
that accompanies these political changes, consensus
around the underlying values that might guide the de-
velopment of the health system, is difficult to achieve
and the developments from previous policy work are
continually undermined. Inefficiencies and duplication
are an inevitable consequence, as one Haïtian consultant
explained: “it’s a system that doesn’t want to develop, but
which nevertheless absorbs a lot of money”. For the donor
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community, this makes it difficult to align to a “plan” that
has limited predictability.
Despite its leadership in state decentralization, as
MSPP officials in our sample readily admitted, the MSPP
lacks the capacity to implement its decentralization pol-
icy and coordinate and monitor the myriad of health
actors, including the public sector. Health partners were
reported to often start projects without MSPP
authorization or with authorization being sought from
health authorities subsequent to activities starting. Lack
of regulation and often a bypassing of official procedures
were reported to create parallel procurement processes
which were also vulnerable to corrupt circumvention of
the governmental system. The private sector particularly,
was reported to be very much beyond the control of the
MSPP. In any case, lines of accountability were no lon-
ger clear, with one dispirited local consultant reflecting:
“there was less impunity; nowadays, a citizen wouldn’t
even know where to lodge a complaint”. While the
MSPP hosts a ‘Direction de la Pharmacie et de la Méde-
cine Traditionnelle’, traditional health service providers
are not regulated, nor is the role of traditional practi-
tioner defined [26]. In addition, health and medical pro-
fessional training is of uneven quality, suffering from
resource constraints and long-standing politicization.
About 80 % of graduates are estimated to leave the
country, mainly for North America but senior MSPP
human resource staff noted that “less than 50 % of these
emigrants continue to practice medicine”. Many of those
who remain leave the public sector to work in non-state
agencies due to better facilities and higher salaries. This
institutionally weak position of the MSPP, creates a vac-
uum in governance and leadership to be filled by the
more powerful donor and multilateral organizations.
Some of our respondents questioned how this power im-
balance affects issues of accountability and whether the
plethora of health organizations is accountable to the
right groups.
A number of respondents, both within government
and the development community, suggested that, given
its financial and human resource constraints, the MSPP
finds itself in a difficult position: dependent on the not-
for-profit sector to provide the service provision that it
is unable to assure, while at the same time, uncomfort-
able with the de facto transition of authority to that sec-
tor. A former Minister of Health, on the other hand,
accused foreign powers of intentionally weakening the
Haïtian state by propping up non-state actors. A number
of accusations were also made that MSPP strengthening
would actually not be in the interest of private not-for-
profit providers such as NGOs and churches. After all, it
is not only the stream of funds, but also institutional
building and learning that benefit the private not-for-
profit, instead of the public sector. Where facilities
created previously by an NGO, were handed over to the
MSPP, sustainability was cited by many of the respon-
dents as a critical issue, with inadequate planning and
accounting for non-deferrable, recurrent expenditure.
Despite the weaknesses of the MSPP, donors, UN
agencies and those NGOs with any interest in en-
gaging the MSPP, pay formal lip service to the MSPP
as if it were fully in charge, as one Haïtian develop-
ment practitioner explained, reflecting a view of many
of our respondents: “the true leadership lies with the
international agencies and their implementers, the
NGOs”. Health partners were accused as a result of
“acting symbolically and hypocritically” while the
MSPP was overwhelmed by the amount of paperwork
generated by co-operation projects which need to be
approved and reported on. Being entirely donor-
dependent, declining proposals was reported as being
virtually impossible for the MSPP. A key multilateral
advisor to the MSPP observed that “the Ministry
doesn’t have the ultimate authority” and that as a
result, “the Ministry is always in favour of all pro-
posals”. Yet, pliable as it is to their demands, donors
appear to have little confidence in the MSPP. Particu-
larly since the earthquake, the subsequent hurricanes
and the cholera epidemic, external donor funding has
increased exponentially, without a corresponding in-
crease in local absorptive capacity. Donors now have
significant financial investment, and a shared desire
to influence change, but there is no consensus be-
tween them that would provide a consistent direction
to drive change. Despite the substantial financial in-
vestment, current initiatives do not build on-going
capacity, continuing management structures, or en-
during local systems. Indeed, from the perspective of
one Haïtian consultant, the current action by many
donors to effectively replace state service provision
has not produced better results than the state would
have done. This directly resulted in “a policy of weak-
ening the state”, but despite undermining state gov-
ernance, failures were still attributed to local failings:
“the argument [made] is always the lack of management,
the corruption…”. What results had been achieved quickly
perished: “les resultats sont périssables”.
Discussion
In this paper using Haïti as an example, we have
explored through the lens of the marketplace, what hap-
pens when the state is unable to comprehensively carry
out its key responsibilities in health service delivery
across the population. In Haïti, the lack of state capacity
to provide an enabling environment, establish, and en-
force its regulatory framework and develop a clear vision
and plan for the health system has resulted in a highly
segmented and informal health market. In this informal
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health marketplace, there are a plethora of health actors
including traditional practitioners and public and private
practitioners schooled in professionalized biomedicine.
The status of some of these practitioners is not always
clear with the boundaries between public/private, for
profit/not-for-profit, legal/illegal often hazy and shifting.
What is clear however, is that health care beyond the
limited reach of state services, has developed into a pri-
vatised, commoditised and largely unregulated service.
Within this context, as in other fragile states, the scope
of public services, including health care provided by the
state is extremely limited, yet research has continued to
largely focus on this formal public health sector which
provides the minority of health care [19–21, 31, 33, 34].
The donor response to this largely dysfunctional
health system has been to bridge the supply-side gap
with external, non-state, private health providers. In
part, this approach has historical roots, with the state
devolving responsibility for health services to the not-
for-profit sector, in particular the Churches. Essentially,
donors through NGOs, public-private partnerships and
bilateral agreements have provided the finance, advice,
technologies, human resources and services they deem
necessary to deliver directed, subsidised health services
and products. Alongside this, other private providers
have stepped into to fill the vacuum created by state fra-
gility. The presence of these other players acts as an in-
centive for patients to abandon the public system, thus
reducing demand and further shifting stewardship of the
health system from the hands of the state to the market.
Limited in its capacity to provide adequate services or to
coordinate or discipline errant partners, the MSPP often
feels unable to refuse any external complement to Haïti’s
health services. These factors all contribute to market
failure, including counterfeit drugs, inappropriate drug
use, inappropriate quality and cost of care and a frag-
mented health system [5]. As in other fragile or conflict
affected states, this condition of fragility and lack of
stewardship is not the result of a simple linear process.
It is the result of a range of exogenous and endogenous
pressures including history, violent conflict, political in-
stability, multiple disasters and human agency. These
factors render the state in a perpetuating cycle of fragil-
ity and an enduring state of emergency resistant to rem-
edy, vulnerable to recurrent shocks and stuck in
underdevelopment [8, 33, 35].
As demonstrated by Haïti’s poor health outcomes, the
emphasis on supply-side issues and direct provision of
services has yielded limited results. As Barder [36] and
Ikpe [33] have observed, failure to focus on demand side
issues and institutional capacity building often has the
perverse effect of further undermining the states cap-
acity to fulfil its obligations. In Haïti, the strategy of
favouring NGOs as service providers has made
institution building unsustainable and left issues of ac-
countability and transparency unresolved [35]. Newbran-
der [34] observes that contracting to NGOs allows for
expanding health services quickly, but may substantially
bypass government mechanisms, as was suggested in the
present study. While it would unfair to attribute the
weakness of the Haïtian health system solely to the par-
allel modus operandi of external actors, failure to engage
with the MSPP perpetuates a vicious circle, whose detri-
mental outcomes impact directly on the Haïtian popula-
tion. Lewis [37] has also observed that returns on health
investments may fail to materialise if institutional cap-
acity building is not addressed. Rather than building up
parallel organisations, Cammack et al. [31] call for work-
ing through government institutions as much as pos-
sible. Where alignment with the host government’s plans
and procedures is not possible, they recommend consid-
ering ‘shadow systems alignment’, whereby delivery is
compatible with existing or future state structures.
The weakness of the MSPP is a reflection of the weak-
ness of the state itself and it is unrealistic to expect the
MSPP to initiate change on its own. Further, the non-
state actors, for and not-for-profit, appear to be quite
content with the status quo. A request for regulation, for
respect of standards and accountability is unlikely to
come from their side. Donors—multilateral and bilatera-
l—are therefore left as the most likely initiators for
change. For donors however, funding non-state actors is
a way of much less resistance than trying to work
through the public sector which admittedly would not
be without risks. Maintenance of the status quo however,
carries an enormous deficit in terms of effectiveness,
efficiency and accountability and ultimately is not a
viable option. Clearly, current donor strategies are not
leading to sustainable, improved health outcomes, nor is
an imposition of regulatory frameworks and approaches
from high-income countries realistic [5]. Thus donors
need to look for new, more nuanced, incremental ways
to engage with the state in fragile environments where
informal markets prevail [18, 33].
Chauvet and Collier [38] observe that aid can be an
effective component for building state capacity both dir-
ectly and indirectly. Strategies to reverse fragility and
poor health outcomes however need to be purposeful,
directed at multiple layers of state and society and long-
term. They need to address the different market seg-
ments and the different market functions of supply and
demand, rules and supporting functions and recognise
that the provision of healthcare is determined by market
considerations. It also requires sustained effort to de-
velop the capacity of the state in budgeting, prioritising
policy action and resources, coordination of related ac-
tivities, monitoring, improved regulatory environment,
analysis and delivery of tangible health outcomes. It
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includes working with the state to define the roles and
responsibilities of the public sector in stewardship with
aid flows aligned to country needs rather than donor
country strategic needs [5].
Donors also need to use their influence to ensure that
the non-state actors it funds engage in a meaningful way
with the state rather than simply playing lip service to
engagement. Donors funding health activities, for
example, are in a position to demand evidence that
agencies that they fund have engaged with the state, dis-
cussed their proposals with the MSPP before awarding
contracts. As well as top-down strategies, bottom up
strategies are essential [18]. This includes working with
local village and health committees and looking at how
the design of a public health program can provide
opportunities and incentives for collective action to de-
mand better services [18, 33]. Other strategies include
increasing demand-side awareness, understanding what
incentives would encourage self-regulation and the for-
mation of voluntary professional bodies to create public
authority outside of the state [5].
As with all research, our research has limitations. Most
importantly, the data available in the scientific and
“grey” literature primarily refers to the public sector; yet
as the case study has demonstrated there is a thriving
health market beyond the public sector. There is a need
for an in-depth analysis that extends our understanding
of the public health sector to a comprehensive represen-
tation of all contributors to the health system as a whole,
mapping the supply and demand factors operating
within the formal, informal, private, non-governmental
organization and faith-based market segments for Haïti.
Secondly, while the approaches used in this study have
allowed the collection of rich, qualitative information,
the study was also constrained by this unevenness of the
available information, with its bias towards the state sec-
tor and to a lesser extent, not-for-profit private pro-
viders, resulting in uneven insights in relation to other
important, but poorly documented, market segments.
Conclusion
Characteristics of the health system described here, such
as reduced public provision health, weak regulation,
market diversification and the commodification of public
goods are seen elsewhere. This case study suggests that
donors need to develop new ways of working in fragile
and conflict affected environments, recognizing the need
to accept and work with this blurring of traditional
mutually-exclusive categories. This broader understand-
ing includes recognising that that effective, accountable
formal institutions evolve through a complex interaction
between state and society, public and private actors, for-
mal and informal institutions [18]. The new paradigms
of operation will require working with the state, as well
as exploring ways of harnessing the health service
provision that occurs beyond the reach of the state, doc-
umenting this process so that it supplements current,
but poorly explored health systems research. This is the
next research and policy challenge: to explore the com-
plex structures of health service provision in these
under-governed areas, to identify within them the exist-
ing or emergent systems of governance and accountabil-
ity, and to work with them to bridge the gaps in health
care provision, to ensure that top-down capacity build-
ing initiatives, when they eventually reach these marginal
areas, engage an effective civil society response.
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